Why did philosophy and the sciences in the East lose their momentum and enthusiasm in the 12th century, leaving the West to take the most importantprogressive steps from the 17th century up to the present day? Can these two intellectual traditions be separated from each other to such an extent as to justify today's theses of conflict? If they cannot be separated, how can the historical events that place these theses on the agenda can be explained? The aim of this (...) short study is to try to find answers to the above questions within the context of two representative philosophers, and to reveal the extent to which the easternand western traditions are implicated with each other, contrary to some claims, by examining the 17th century, which as a turning point is a very important historical period. (shrink)

Why did philosophy and the sciences in the East lose their momentum and enthusiasm in the 12th century, leaving the West to take the most importantprogressive steps from the 17th century up to the present day? Can these two intellectual traditions be separated from each other to such an extent as to justify today's theses of conflict? If they cannot be separated, how can the historical events that place these theses on the agenda can be explained? The aim of this (...) short study is to try to find answers to the above questions within the context of two representative philosophers, and to reveal the extent to which the easternand western traditions are implicated with each other, contrary to some claims, by examining the 17th century, which as a turning point is a very important historical period. (shrink)

Küresel güç mücadelesinde ağırlık merkezinin son yıllarda Asya-Pasifik’e kaymasıyla birlikte, 21. yüzyılın yükselen iki gücü olan Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti (ÇHC) ile Hindistan arasındaki rekabet de önemli ölçüde arttı. Hindistan’ın 1947’de İngiltere’den bağımsızlığını kazanması ile Çin’in Komünist bir Halk Cumhuriyeti olarak 1949’da kurulmasından günümüze dek aralarında süregelen sınır anlaşmazlıkları, iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiyi belirleyen en önemli konuların başında gelmektedir. İki ülkenin de geçmişinde Batı’nın aşağılayıcı müdahalelerine maruz kalmış olmasının yanında bu dönemde uluslararası siyasete hâkim olan iki kutupluluğun dünya barışına hizmet etmeyeceğine (...) olan ortak inançları dünya barışı için alternatif bir oluşum olan Bağlantısızlık Hareketine katılmalarını sağladı. Dolayısıyla bu iki neden ve her iki ülkenin de ulus-devlet oluşumunun erken aşamalarında olması, kuruluşlarının ilk on yılında birbirlerine karşı idealist yaklaşımlar benimsemelerini sağladı. Ancak çok geçmeden her iki ülkenin de materyal kapasitelerini arttırmasıyla birlikte çatışmaya başlayan ulusal çıkarları, Asya idealizminin altını oymaya başladı. Netice itibariyle 1962 gibi erken bir dönemde sıcak çatışmaya girerek Asya idealizmini bir kenara bırakıp ulus devlet realizmini benimsemiş oldular. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma 21. yüzyılın yükselen iki gücü arasındaki en sorunlu alanlardan biri olan sınır anlaşmazlıklarının süreç içerisindeki evrimini ve bunun iki ülkenin dış politika vizyonlarının değişimleri üzerindeki etkisini ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. Bu analizde neoklasik realizm teorik bir çerçeve olarak rehberlik ederken ÇHC ve Hindistan arasındaki sınır sorunlarının yerel, bölgesel ve küresel yönlerini ve bunların iki ülkenin dış politikası üzerindeki etkilerini anlamak için süreç izleme yöntemi kullanılacaktır. (shrink)

Ibn al-ʻArabī, 1165-1240.; Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam; criticism and interpretation; Islamic philosophy; early works to 1800.

Arabic was among the sciences that were widely taught along with religious sciences for reasons such as the fact that the basic sources of religion were in Arabic, the need to teach the language to non-Arabs in parallel with the expansion of borders, the spread of errors (lahn) in the language, Arabic being the dominant language in official correspondence and its use as a language of science. To ensure a better understanding of religious texts, to present the lessons clearly and (...) comprehensibly, to be a qualified preacher and orator, to bring evidence and justify ideas, and to be successful in debate and jadal also required a good command of Arabic. These reasons and needs paved the way for the formation and teaching of nahw as a branch of science; its teaching took place in places such as bādiye (desert), kuttāb, houses, masjids, mosques, bookstores, libraries, government offices, and madrasas. This study deals with the teaching of Arabic from the perspective of madrasas and focuses on the teaching of literary sciences in general, and the teaching of grammar in particular, by focusing on the Nizāmiyyah and Mustansiriyyah Madrasas. The aim of this study is to reveal that the Arabic language was taught in these madrasas both as preparation and support for religious sciences and as a separate field. In this context, the study aims to reveal in which centers the Arabic language was taught before the establishment of madrasas and how it continued. Nizāmiyyah Madrasas are the general name of the madrasas founded in Baghdad, the first of which was in Nîsâbûr, in 449-450/1057-1058 by the Great Seljuk vizier Nizāmulmulk (d. 485/1092). And the Mustansiriyya Madrasah was built between 625/1227-28 and 631/1233-34 by Abu Ca‘far Mansûr Mustansır-Billah (623-640/1212-1242), one of the caliphs of the Abbasid State (750-1258). In these madrasas, especially in the Nizāmiyyah Madrasas, religious sciences (such as Shāfi’ī jurisprudence, hadīth, Qur’ān and tafsīr), and among these, especially the sciences of fiqh (furu', usūl, ferā'īz, madhhab, and hilāf) were taught. Although in these madrasas did not have an independent nahw chair or a department devoted to nahw, it is understood from the sources that courses on nahw were given due to the need for it. However, it is understood from the sources that nahw was also taught in these madrasas. In fact, the endowment of the Baghdad Nizāmiyyah Madrasah clearly states that a teacher of grammar (nahw) will be hired for the teaching of grammar, and moreover, there are considerable scholars of grammar among the mudarris working here. It is also understood from the biographies of the students who studied in madrasas that the science of nahw was taught. However, it should be noted that these madrasas did not have an independent nahw chair or a department for nahw. Since the research focuses on a historical issue, it was handled with the technique of analyzing written documents. Accordingly, the data were obtained primarily from the main sources related to the period/madrasas; current research was also utilized, especially in the interpretation, comparison, inference, and justification of claims. (shrink)

The epistemic basic structure of a society consists of those institutions that have the greatest impact on individuals’ opportunity to obtain knowledge on questions they have an interest in as citizens, individuals, and public officials. It plays a central role in the production and dissemination of knowledge and in ensuring that people have the capability to assimilate this knowledge. It includes institutions of science and education, the media, search engines, libraries, museums, think tanks, and various government agencies. This article identifies (...) two demands of justice that apply specifically to the institutions that belong to it. First, the epistemic basic structure should serve all citizens fairly and reliably. It should provide them with the opportunity to acquire knowledge they need for their deliberations about the common good, their individual good, and how to pursue them. Second, the epistemic basic structure should produce and disseminate the knowledge that various experts and public officials need to successfully pursue justice and citizens need to effectively exercise their rights. After arguing for these duties, I discuss what policies follow from them and respond to the worry that these duties have illiberal implications. (shrink)

Ethics and morality, fundamental concepts in human society, are expected to be upheld by individuals and effectively taught by teachers to new generations. This study delves into the perceptions of preservice teachers regarding ethics and good within the framework of an ethics and morality course in education. It also explores the ethical and unethical behaviors these teachers most commonly encounter in their school experiences. Utilizing a qualitative case study methodology, the research provides an in-depth analysis of ethics, the concept of (...) good, ethical and unethical behaviors within the Turkish context. Through thematic analysis of data collected over various weeks, the findings reveal that participants perceive ethics as actions, individuals, and ideas that embody values such as justice, respect, and honesty. Their decision-making is influenced by diverse ethical filters aligned with normative ethical theories. For instance, an act is deemed ethical if it does not limit freedom and harm others, conforms to societal norms, benefits others, adheres to laws and rules, instills a sense of righteousness, and stems from good intentions. Furthermore, the study identifies six key qualities defining the concept of good: evoking happiness, being beneficial, proper, pure, preferred, and encompassing both moral and ethical dimensions. The experiences of ethical and unethical acts among participants predominantly relate to themes of inequality versus justice, harshness versus love, ineffective versus effective teaching, inconsistency versus role model behaviors, undesired versus desired relationships with school stakeholders, and the breach versus balance between professional and private life. Overall, this research highlights significant aspects of how preservice teachers perceive the concepts of ethics and good along with unethical behaviors, offering valuable insights for teacher education. (shrink)

Education is a phenomenon that has existed from the early times of human beings, but it has recently become a scientific discipline. Until recently, there were no separate fields such as education, religious education, moral and value education. Therefore, their separation from each other as scientific disciplines is also a new phenomenon. In fact, in the historical process, education has a religious and moral character in itself, and these two have not seen independent from each other. Here religion has provided (...) meaningful goals and objectives to education, while morality constitutes one of the important aims of this education. Besides, the religious and moral character of education has also been significant in order to accrue a positive and balanced personality. For this reason, it is of great importance to understand how the modern concepts of education, religious education, and moral education have been dealt with in traditional education or in historical processes. Hārith al-Muhāsibī (d. 243/857), among the founding names of Ahl as-Sunnah theology and Sufism, was one of the early scholars who emphasized that the heart, mind (‘akl) and soul (nafs), forming the dynamic structure and the source for human’s positive and negative actions, should be educated in a certain measure and equilibrium, and who presented various concepts and terms in this direction. It seems that Muhāsibī refers to different concepts concerning the humans’ change and transformation, his education and training. In this respect, our study aims to deal with the concepts Muhāsibī used within education, religion and moral education in today’s terms and to reveal in which meanings he used these terms. It is also hoped that considering the concepts of education in the traditional and classical concept will make it easier to understand the current content of education, the changes and specialism it has experienced. The concepts that Muhāsibī dealt with on education, especially on decency (adab/ta’dīb), have a religious and moral theme in accordance with the general understanding of the period. Among the main concepts that Muhasibi includes are educating/teaching (ta‘līm/ta‘allum), instruction/teaching (dars/tadrīs), decency, purification (tathīr, ıslāh and tasfiya), and mucāhada. It seems that he doesn’t deal with the concepts such as tarbiyah, tahzīb, tazkiya and riyāzat at all or very little. Among them, Muhāsibī was especially interested in decency/adab, as it was handled in the context of Sufism, with a religious/moral view and mostly in the way of educating the soul. In addition, it is observed that other concepts are handled with a similar perspective. (shrink)

The debate on the Prophet’s parents’ (abawayn al-Rasūl) religious status and their position in the hereafter goes back to several narrations from the Prophet himself. This subject, which can principally be considered part of the problem of the religious status of ahl al-fatrah, seems to be raised by the Shīʿah as an issue of creed in line with their understanding of imamate. Abū Ḥanīfah’s (d. 150/767) statement in his al-Fiqh al-akbar that “Prophet’s parents passed away on kufr/jāhiliyyah” is seen as (...) a Sunnī reaction to this earlier position and led to a new area of discussion shaping the approach of several scholars to the issue. The earliest treatises dedicated to this issue are attributed to al-Ghazzālī (d. 505/1111) and Abū Bakr Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 543/1148), but these works did not survive to this day. The earliest examples available today are the six epistles that al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) penned. Literature on the Prophet’s parents flourished during the Ottoman times after the introduction of al-Fiqh al-akbar to the Ottoman scholarship. Starting with the first examples that belong to Ibrāhīm al-Ḥalabī (d. 956/1549), Ibn al-Khaṭīb al-Amāsī (d. 940/1534), and Kamālpashazādah (d. 940/1534), the treatises in question were mostly written in Arabic in the Ottoman scholarly milieu. Consequently, it seems that Rawḍat al-ṣafā fī wāliday al-Muṣṭafá is the first treatise dedicated to the issue in Ottoman Turkish. In the library catalogue records, some bio-bibliographical sources, and consequently in some modern studies on the issue of abawayn al-Rasūl, Rawḍat al-ṣafā wrongly attributed to a certain Wajdī Aḥmad Efendī (in Turkish: Vecdî Ahmed Efendi). This is probably due to the author’s presentation of himself in the introduction as just “Wajdī,” without making further description. Besides the data in Bursalı Meḥmed Ṭāhir’s Osmanlı Müʾellifleri, no more information could be provided about the identity of Wajdī Aḥmad Efendī who is shown as the author of the treatise. Intra-textual signs such as the author’s words about the reason and process of writing the work, the way he handled the subject and the evidence he put forward indicate that the treatise belongs to Nūḥ ibn Muṣṭafá al-Qūnawī (d. 1070/1660). Indeed, it overlaps with the fact that Nūḥ ibn Muṣṭafá presented himself as Wajdī in many of his other works. Seemingly the fact that Nūḥ ibn Muṣṭafá defends the view that the parents of the Prophet are among the people of salvation (ahl al-najāh), and while doing this, he was mainly based on the view that they were resurrected after death and that their souls are recaptured after they believed in the Prophet, stem from various reasons such as the view that attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah, Nūḥ’s Sufi identity to the extent that he was initiated to the Khalwatiyyah/Gulshaniyyah along with the ever-growing Sufi influences and the consequent idea of nūr-i Muḥammadī in the public sphere, the authority of the narrations attributed to the Prophet, and perception about the Prophet Muḥammed in the public imagination. (shrink)

This volume is the first collection focusing on the claim that we cannot but account for emotions if we are to understand the processes and evaluations related to empirical knowledge.

Concepts, such as death, life and spirit cannot be known in their quintessential nature, but can be defined in accordance with their effects. In fact, those who think within the mode of pragmatism and Cartesian logic have ignored the metaphysical aspects of these terms. According to Islam, the entity that moves the body is named the soul. And the aliment of the soul is air. Cessation of breathing means leaving of the soul from the body. Those who agree on the (...) diagnosis of brain death may not able to agree unanimously on the rules that lay down such diagnosis. That is to say, there are a heap of suspicions regarding the diagnosis of brain death, and these suspicions are on the increase. In fact, Islamic jurisprudence does not put provisions, decisions on suspicious grounds. By virtue of these facts, it can be asserted that brain death is not absolute death according to Islamic sources; for in the patients diagnosed with brain death the soul still has not abandoned the body. Therefore, these patients suffer in every operation performed on them. (shrink)

Among the problems C. D. Bailey has questioned in a recent paper (Ref. 1) are a precise and general formulation of Hamilton's variational principle and the establishment of a sufficiency criterion for this to be a minimum principle. In this paper, we will try to answer these questions using the geometric theory of classical mechanics.

The political scientist and former Bavarian Minister of Culture Hans Maier has created a historically profound, theologically educated, literarily and musically highly sensitive, politically mature body of work, with which he has inscribed himself in the (intellectual) history of the Federal Republic. This book is the first to contain contributions by renowned scholars and politicians on the rich work and impact of the Catholic scholar and politician Hans Maier. It thematises and appreciates in detail his view of German history and (...) the traditions of political thought, his critique of political language, political theology, totalitarianism and political religions, but also his contributions on Catholicism and modernity, his writings on literature and music, and finally his influence as an academic teacher, public intellectual and politician. With contributions by Udo Bermbach, Thomas Brose, Ahmet Cavuldak, Horst Dreier, Hermann-Josef Große Kracht, Jens Hacke, Oliver Hidalgo, Hans Günter Hockerts, Patrick Horst, Horst Möller, Heinrich Oberreuter, Henning Ottmann, Mark Edward Ruff, Hans Otto Seitschek, Michael Stolleis, Bernhard Vogel, Peter Graf von Kielmansegg, Theo Waigel and Markus Zimmermann. (shrink)

The teaching of ethics in teacher education programs is crucial for fostering the moral and ethical development of prospective teachers and shaping them into ethical role models for future students. This study, employing qualitative case study research, gathered data from undergraduates in teacher education programs to explore the best approaches for ethics education. It found that combining digital and case-based pedagogical methods, fostering an open-minded attitude among lecturers, and implementing a blend of Socratic and active learning techniques leads to the (...) most favorable outcomes. Additionally, continuous formative assessment throughout the academic year is essential. To cultivate a teaching workforce with strong ethical and moral values, undergraduate courses in ethics and morality should be thought-provoking, integrating real-life cases with a mix of digital and tangible resources. The ethics course lecturer should not only serve as a role model and exhibit a caring disposition but also use effective teaching methodologies. The paper details key themes and categories for successful ethics instruction and offers specific recommendations. (shrink)

When the Mamluk Sultan Qalawun (1279-1290) moves to Syria with her army to fight the Mongols, martial law is declared in Egypt. Kalavun's son as heir Salih Ali in Egypt, published to Zaynaddin Ketboğa a tazkire that dated April-1281 containing the martial law decisions. Tezkire talks about the duties and responsibilities of administrators in the context of state-security-service. These decisions are important state affairs in the flow of daily life such as the judiciary, law, justice, security, transportation, service, trade, land, (...) fair tax system, control of civil servants and state affairs. In addition, the healthy living conditions of the detainees, It also includes issues such as meeting the needs of the detainees such as churches and baths. Tazkire decisions aiming to ensure the flow of daily life in Egypt during wartime without causing a possible instability are always valid state policies aiming at state order and social welfare. In our article, we will talk about this tezkire, which was narrated as a full text by İbnü'l-Furât (d. 1405) and Kalkaşendî (d. 1418). (shrink)

It seems natural to think that one of the businesses of the philosophy of language is to provide an explanation of the understanding of language. It is the aim of the present essay to show that and why this is not so. Instead, I shall hold that both meaning and understanding go beyond the scope of traditional philosophy of language. Philosophers widely agree today that the meaning of linguistic expressions is to be explained by recourse to the use of words (...) and sentences; an explanation of this use does not only take recourse to linguistic but to any kind of human practices, and according to Wittgenstein these in turn can neither be fully described from outside these practices nor can they be theoretically captured once and for all. On the account suggested here a model of understanding in general yields a model of the content of linguistic expressions. Such a model of understanding calls for a renewal of philosophy as well as a recasting of philosophical argument and procedure. To sketch this project I shall review Putnam's struggle for an adequate theory of meaning and reference. In trying to disconnect understanding from meaning as far as psychological aspects are concerned, Putnam catches a "problem of reference." A comparable problem finds reflection in Kripke's influential reading of Wittgenstein on rules and private language. In both cases the problem grows from an inadequate use of two central notions, namely objectivity and subjectivity. An alternative reading of Wittgenstein along the lines of McDowell and later Putnam allows a new, pragmatic view on understanding, its subjects, and its objects. (shrink)

When are the meanings of two utterances the same? And how, if at all, could we determine this sameness? In this paper I take a look at the contextualist answer of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis. One characteristic trait of Hilary Putnam's conception of meaning is what he calls 'semantic externalism' and what I shall label 'public semantics' to avoid confusion with the topological or what I call 'locational' connotation of externalism in other contexts:1 the meaning of a word and (...) the full meaning/sense of a sentence or utterance are not determined by some private mental state(s) of the speaker but are determined by the use of words on an occasion or in a saying. According to Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis (both elaborating on Wittgenstein's discussions in his Philosophical Investigations), the varieties of such situational uses or occasions, the varieties of public semantics, can themselves not be described or determined once and for all. It is therefore not possible to reduce or absorb each and every pragmatic aspect into semantics. That means that semantics is essentially open and questions as to the sameness of meaning or sense of utterances cannot be answered independently of a pragmatic approach. Travis extends this diagnosis in his most recent book {Unshadowed Thought) to thought, beliefs and attitudes: no one thought, attitude or belief can be individuated independently of relevant situational aspects, these including, among others, acts in accord with, say, an attitude on some occasion or other. The approach pursued here claims that pragmatics is in either of these areas unavoidable and genuine. It cannot be explained away or be re-absorbed into semantics or epistemology.2 This has important consequences for what it means to do philosophy, as can be seen in Putnam's arguments as to the unintelligibility of various philosophical positions. (shrink)

When are the meanings of two utterances the same? And how, if at all, could we determine this sameness? In this paper I take a look at the contextualist answer of Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis. One characteristic trait of Hilary Putnam's conception of meaning is what he calls 'semantic externalism' and what I shall label 'public semantics' to avoid confusion with the topological or what I call 'locational' connotation of externalism in other contexts:1 the meaning of a word and (...) the full meaning/sense of a sentence or utterance are not determined by some private mental state(s) of the speaker but are determined by the use of words on an occasion or in a saying. According to Hilary Putnam and Charles Travis (both elaborating on Wittgenstein's discussions in his Philosophical Investigations), the varieties of such situational uses or occasions, the varieties of public semantics, can themselves not be described or determined once and for all. It is therefore not possible to reduce or absorb each and every pragmatic aspect into semantics. That means that semantics is essentially open and questions as to the sameness of meaning or sense of utterances cannot be answered independently of a pragmatic approach. Travis extends this diagnosis in his most recent book {Unshadowed Thought) to thought, beliefs and attitudes: no one thought, attitude or belief can be individuated independently of relevant situational aspects, these including, among others, acts in accord with, say, an attitude on some occasion or other. The approach pursued here claims that pragmatics is in either of these areas unavoidable and genuine. It cannot be explained away or be re-absorbed into semantics or epistemology.2 This has important consequences for what it means to do philosophy, as can be seen in Putnam's arguments as to the unintelligibility of various philosophical positions. (shrink)

Abdurrahman Aliy, Felsefenin Tanrısı: Felsefi Teolojiye Giriş [The God of Philosophy: An Introduction to Philosophical Theology], 129 pp.

The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the public sphere from domination of ‘the sacred’, but also the political-theological approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished dominance of ‘the transcendence’, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency in (...) handling human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view, the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by ‘state mentality’, the significance of lifestyle politics for ‘rights talk’ will become more evident. From this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of ‘weak citizenship’ constructed through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the demands for equal respect and dignity. (shrink)

Following the formation of disciplines/sciences in different fields of Islamic thought, the specific concepts and terminologies of these disciplines/sciences began to emerge. Then the special meaning and the area of utilization for every concept in each discipline/science were further clarified by compiling specific epistles of definition (ḥudūd), which would contribute to this process of conceptualization. For the terminological meaning of the used concept to be determined primarily and thus for the followed theological/sectarian affiliation to be supported, works belonging to this (...) genre have been written specifically for the field of theology. Especially, the Muʿtazilī theologians undoubtedly made the greatest contribution. Thusly, specific treatises containing theological concepts were compiled by names such as al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), and his students Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (d. after 420/1029) and Ibn Sharwīn (fl. first half of the Vth/XIth century). Zaydī theologian and jurist Abū’l-Qāsim al-Bustī’s (d. 420/1029) Tahdhīb al-ḥudūd, which has no available copy, is also contemporary to the mentioned works. This tradition found its reflection in the Imāmī-Muʿtazilī line in Abū Jaʿfar al-Ṭūsī’s (d. 460/1067) al-Muqaddimah fī l-madkhal ilá ṣināʿat ʿilm al-kalām, which could be seen as a concise theological work in terms of its construct and the explanations which it comprises, and in the work called al-Ḥudūd wa-l-ḥaqāʾiq, which is attributed to al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍá (d. 436/1044). Abū Jaʿfar al-Muqrī al-Nīsābūrī’s (d. mid-VIth/XIIth century [?]) al-Ḥudūd stands out as the most voluminous example in this tradition. The most important work belonging to this genre in the Muʿtazilī tradition, as it is the first among the available works, is the Ḥudūd al-alfāẓ of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, which is found together with some other important Zaydī-Muʿtazilī works in a compilation discovered by us and thought to be lost until recently. In this treatise, which generally includes theological concepts and partially includes the concepts of Islamic law and the history of sects, al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār has put forward a language-based definition theory. His approach here is in line with the views he put forward on definition in his al-Mughnī. Accordingly, instead of definition (ḥadd) and description (rasm) carried out over five universals in classical logic, he adopted a method of lexical definition based on wording that agrees with the meaning of the concept in question and is clearer than it, and consequently gave a brief definition and explanation of the concept he deals with. This clearly shows that the previous Muʿtazilī theologians’ approach of language-based definition, which was used as an alternative to the conception of Aristotelian definition due to their distanced stance to philosophy was also inherited by al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār. The approach seen in some sources in the period following al-Qāḍī, such as Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī’s al-Ḥudūd, also indicates his influence. (shrink)

This book theorizes and applies critical communication pedagogy in mediated contexts, including social justice-oriented approaches, to the use of both traditional and new media in the classroom.

In the dictionary, kināya, which means “to say a word and to mean a second meaning with that word”, means “to use a word both in its true meaning and in a second meaning other than this meaning“ as the Arabic rhetoric term. The conceptualization process of kināya as a sub-title of the ilm al-bayān started in the second century hijrī and took its present form in the seventh century hijrī with Abū Yaʿqūb al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229) and in the eighth (...) century with Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338). The authors of modern Arabic rhetoric, based on the methodological approaches of these two authors in their definitions and classifications of kināya, sometimes adopted the same approach as they were, and sometimes made some additions and criticisms by making original evaluations. For example, Qazvinî's لفظ أريد به لازم معناه مع جواز إرادة معناه حينئذ “(Original) meaning can be meant, but the necessary meaning is the word that is meant by it.” While some contemporary authors have taken the definition of kināya with the same words, some have added the phenomenon of clue to this definition. There is a similar situation in the classification of kināya, and while some authors have taken the categorization made by Sakkākī without making any changes, some authors have made various additions to this division. In the modern period covering the last century, many books have been written on Arabic rhetoric, and some of these books have come to the fore in Arab countries and our country. In this study, in the context of the subject of kināya, twelve of the Arabic rhetoric books written in the modern period were selected and the definitions and classifications of kināya in these books were examined. The aim of this study is to bring together and compare various perspectives on kināya in contemporary Arabic rhetoric books and to identify different approaches to the subject. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a novel version of the multiverse theory of sets called hierarchical pluralism by introducing the notion of “degrees of intentionality” of theories. The presented view is articulated for the purpose of reconciling epistemological realism and the multiverse theory of sets so as to preserve a considerable amount of epistemic objectivity when working with the multiverse theory. I give some arguments in favor of a hierarchical picture of the multiverse in which theories or models are thought (...) to be ordered with respect to their plausibility as a manifestation of endorsing the idea that some set theories are more plausible than others. The proposed multiverse account settles the pluralist’s dilemma, the dichotomy that there is a trade-off between the richness of mathematical ontology and the objectivity of mathematical truth. The view also extends and serves as an alternative position to Balaguer’s intention-based Platonism, from which he claims that a certain version of mathematical pluralism follows. (shrink)

One of the most important issues that distinguishes the Baghdādī branch of the Muʿtazila from the Baṣran branch is their view on ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661). Basra branch accepts the order of virtue of the first four caliphs as their order of coming to office, while the Baghdad branch considers the first three caliphs legitimate, but considers Ali more virtuous than them. The Baghdādī Muʿtazilīs who outspokenly defended this idea were Abū Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī (...) (d. 319/931) and Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258). Among them, Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd was renowned as “the greatest scholar of the Muʿtazila” and was considered one of the last representatives of this school. He ardently defended ʿAlī's superiority in his commentary on Nahj al-Balāgha, the famous collection of Ali’s sermons, letters and wisdom sayings. In his defense, he rebutted some criticisms about ʿAlī’s political decisions from his school’s point of view. Many items of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s rebuttal are worthy of analysis in terms of their content, style and approach. This article aims to present a detailed account of Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd’s aforementioned refutations. In addition to the descriptive method, the interpretative method was also employed in the article. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd did not consider Ali's infallibility necessary (wājib), unlike Imamiyya, he accepted it. Therefore, he responded to the criticisms directed at Ali, starting from the point of Ali's innocence. According to Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd: (a) After the death of the Prophet, ʿAlī insisted on becoming the new leader of the Muslim community. He did not act hastily to assume the caliphate because he was not expecting any opposition to that. However, when the events took a different turn, he did not escalate the situation, rather accepted the status quo. (b) ʿAlī also did the right thing by participating in ʿUmar b. Al-Khaṭṭāb’s (d. 23/644) electoral shūrā. This was an opportunity for him to become the next caliph, and reinstitute a system in accordance with the Qurʿānic principles and sunna of the Prophet. (c) It was also not an error when ʿAlī decided to stay in Medina during the events of ʿUthmān’s murder (d. 35/656). He played an active role in dissuading the rebels from their attempt to kill ʿUthmān, but he was in no position to know that his activity would be used against him later by the Umayyads who accused ʿAlī of being complicit in ʿUthmāns’s murder. (d) ʿAlī took the caliphate after ʿUthmān because of his popularity among the people. In this way, he managed to prevent an unqualified person to occupy the seat of the caliphate. (e) When the Battle of Camel broke out, those who demanded justice and opposed ʿAlī were in error. (f) When ʿAlī became the new caliph, his decision to remove Muʿāwīya (d. 60/680) from the governorship of Syria was correct. This is because Muʿāwīya would have refused to accept ʿAlī’s leadership even had he stayed in office as a governor. ʿAlī understood that the conflict would end only through fighting, so he did not lose time in marching against Muʿāwīya. (g) During the battle he abided by the sharīʿa and allowed the Syrian army to access water. (h) It was not ʿAlī, but those defectors in his army who obliged him to end the fighting through arbitration. (i) When ʿAlī agreed to sign the Ṣiffīn ceasefire agreement and did not use his title amīr al-muʾminīn, he followed the Prophet's example since the latter also refrained from using his title during the Ḥudaybiyya agreement. (j) ʿAlī also cannot be blamed for those among his supporters, such as the poet al-Najāshī, who defected and joined the ranks of Muʿāwīya. The motivations for the defectors were either to attain worldly gains or to escape from punishment for the crimes which they had committed. (k) When Muʿāwīya managed to conquer Egypt, ʿAlī’s governors of the province, Qays b. Saʿd (d. 60/680) or Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (d. 38/658), did nothing for which they could be blamed. (l) And finally, ʿAlī never had guards to protect him because he was never afraid of being assassinated. Although Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd took Ali's innocence as a basis while presenting these views, he did not make inconsistent comments in general and did not say things contrary to historical facts. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge historical value of his views in question. (shrink)

: The corpus of fatwa named as Bostānu Shaqā’iq al-Nuʿmān, recorded in the Veliyuddin Efendi section under the number 1414 at Beyazıd State Library. It has been ignored so far. Because of its name, it may be thought that it is a part of Tashkoprulüzāde’s book Shaḳā’iḳ-i Nuʿmāniyya, but it is a nuqullu fatwa collection of Babakūshī ʿAbdurrahmān Efendi. In the famous Shaqā’iq appendix Atā’ī, which gives information about the biography of Abdurrahmān Efendi does not mention the book with this (...) name. Abdurrahman Efendi who was from a family in Plovdiv region worked in different positions in Istanbul and Edirne. Then, he was appointed as a mufti to Kefe, Crimea. He died in 983/1576. There is no information about his scholarly identity in ‛Aṭā‛ī except being the intern of Abū l-Suʿūd Efendi. In this essay, first of all, the place of Babakūshī in Ottoman Islamic Law tradition will be determined, and the features of the manuscripts and some notes on the postscript will be studied. In assessment section, especially because of the notes on the manuscripts, it has to be studied in terms of Islamic Law literature and its place should be figured out in fatwa literature. Summary: Nuqullu Fatwa collections that included citations were the books that were created for people to have access to the ruling on legal issues of scholars who were appointed as Muslim judges or muftis together with their sources and background. Although there are several studies in the literature about fatwa collections with citations Babakūshī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Efendi's book titled Bostânu Shaqā'iḳ al-Nuʿmān was not included in the literature. ‛Aṭā‛ī provides information about the life of Babakūshī Abdurrahman Efendi. Atâ'î explains that he climbed the stairs with the help of Baba Efendi and joined the special group of people with aptitude at the level of apprenticeship. Then he raised also to the level of being the intern of Abū l-Suʿūd Efendi. Later, Babakūshī ʿAbd al-Raḥmān started to teach. He taught as a teacher for three years in Istanbul and then became the Mufti of Kefe replacing Molla Akmal al-Dīn. Molla Ekmeleddin, who was better known as Ekmel Efendi, just like ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Efendi, was an apprentice of Abū l-Suʿūd Efendi and would later be transferred to Cyprus after the island was conquered. According to Aṭā‛ī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Efendi remained in that position which he was appointed as Ṣahn teacher until his death and died in Zilqāda 983/February 1576. The highest position that Babakūshī took among the religious scholars organization in the Ottoman Empire was being the Mufti of Kefe. As stated by ‛Aṭā‛ī, he was appointed as the Mufti of Kefe with the title of Ṣahn teacher. Instead of giving information about his teachers, ‛Aṭā‛ī mostly concentrated on Baba Efendi who was one of his relatives. Therefore we do not have information about his mentors/teachers. We can say that he belonged to the Ottoman school of scholars since he was an apprentice of Abū l-Suʿūd Efendi. The copy which is the subject matter of this study is registered as Veliyüddin Efendi with number 1414 at Bāyezıd State Library. According to our research, the copy which has 237 sheets is the only copy of the book. From the expressions of Babakūshī in the preface, it is concluded that the book was written close to his death. There are several notes written with different pens as footnotes of the book. Here, four of them which are considered to be more important will be identified.First: Notes written with the same pen as the main text. These are generally citations from books such as Tatarkhāniyye, Hidāya, ‛İnâya, Kashf al-Asrâr Sharḥu Manār.Second: are 'maṭlabs' i.e. important matters. Third: are relatively inelaborate notes. These were written by someone who we thought was not a copyist/calligrapher when compared with the general style of the book. Fourth: Warning notes which included some questions. These are generally in Turkish. The preface of the book, provides sufficient information about who the author was and the nature of the book. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Efendi, with the intention of writing a collection, started to research taking into account imams' and shaykhs' nāsikh and mensūkh and he also considered sheikhs' explanations about what was definite and what needed caution and taqwa in practice. He recorded that this search lasted for 3 years and he referred especially to Fatāwa-yi Qādikhān and Fatāwa-yı Tatarkhāniyya within this period and additionally reviewed and studied Islamic Law books that he found in the Ottoman Empire. He described that he divided these into chapters and inserted subject matters in the footnotes. Then he described how he gave the title, Bostānu Shaqā'iḳ al-Nuʿmān to the book emphasizing especially bostan.This could be seen in the expression, Masīratan li'l-Qudāt. No reference was made to Shaqā'iḳ al-Nuʿmān in the title of the book. Probably he had his intentions due to the famous book titled Şeḳ' āiḳ-i Nuʿmaniye and his pupils). In the chapter which started with Fasl right after the preface the author said that fatwa would be issued based on the opinions of three imams, namely Abū Ḥanīfa, Abu Yūsuf and Imām Muhammed that their madhap was followed and their good morals were observed. Then, it was stated that the Mufti could issue fatwas according to the opinions of first, Abū Ḥanīfa, then Abu Yūsuf and finally Imam Muḥammed. It was also stated that if he could not find their opinions and had himself muctehid, he could give his ictihad. The Fatwa collection, Bostān, is an important work among the 16th century Ottoman books since it is an important scholar's book who had witnessed Islamic knowledge in the central Ottoman Empire and Crimean region. (shrink)